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ABSTRACT
The corporate board usually influences all important decisions of a firm 
including setting of its long-term goals, developing a corporate strategic 
policy, as well as hiring and setting the compensation of the chief executive. 
Moreover, the organization of the board may have a significant effect on 
the monitoring and governance of the company. This paper analyses the 
impact of structure of the board and firm performance on chief executive 
compensation, in an emerging economy context specifically, Pakistan. Chief 
executive compensation is one of the controversial and sought after topics 
in research nowadays. Interestingly, the exploration into the topic has found 
that there is a significant and positive impact of the non-executive directors 
serving on the corporate boards on the compensation of chief executive. 
Furthermore, the size of the board has also showed to have a significant 
and positive impact on the chief executive’s compensation which logically 
means that the companies in which the boards are larger than the mean size 
will relatively pay higher to their chief executives. Also it was found that 
the performance of the firm does not have a statistically significant impact 
on chief executive compensation. These results have policy implications 
and are important to corporate stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
From managing and supervising important company’s affairs to providing 
entrepreneurial leadership, the board of directors has many functional and 
legal responsibilities towards a company. The board impacts many important 
decisions of a firm including setting of its long-term goals and developing a 
strategic policy. Sometimes, the board’s opinion has a much greater impact 
on the top management’s decision. That is, when a company enters into a 
new business or makes a big investment, the senior staff and CEO relies 
heavily on individual directors for expert advice and maintaining personal 
relationships with external parties. Individual directors use their external 
contacts with the business leaders for the advancement of the company. 
Moreover, they may sometimes become deeply involved in the day-to-day 
operations of a company, especially when it is facing sustained decline in its 
net income or there is a new managing director in a firm (Chitayat, 1984).
The composition, structure and style of the boardroom also impact 
company performance. While staggered boards are linked with low debt-to-
capital ratio (Jiraporn & Liu, 2008); companies with small boards are linked 
with taking risky investments (Wang, 2012). The board style is also linked 
with many key performance indicators including return on equity and assets. 
The organization of the board has a significant effect on the monitoring and 
corporate governance of a company. Shareholders appoint board of directors 
and so, the major objective of the board and its Chairman is to maximize 
shareholder wealth in the short-run as well as in the long-run. The board 
ensures that the agency issue between shareholders and management is 
minimized, so that right decisions are taken at the right time to develop a 
base for sustainable shareholder well-being maximization. Many laws and 
public reforms have now been formed and introduced to protect the right 
of shareholders and tighten corporate governance. 
Corporate governance for emerging economies is a topic of vital 
importance (Patel, 2018). The purpose of this research is to investigate 
the role that board structure plays in determining the compensation of top 
management and also the impact, if any, of the firm’s financial performance 
on the compensation, in the context of an emerging economy i.e. Pakistan. 
This topic is much important for the emerging economies because they 
have different dynamics and are closely controlled (Shah, 2011), so due to 
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this, the research results of developed economies cannot be used for policy 
development in an emerging economy context. Furthermore, Pakistan’s 
code of corporate governance was announced in 2001 but lacks complete 
implementation (Mir & Nishat, 2004).
Executive remuneration is one the most debated topics in corporate 
governance, academics, policymaking and media (Conyon, 2006). There 
are many determinants of executive compensation including company’s 
performance, corporate governance, power of the individual directors, and 
industry in which the company operates. This papers aims to determine one 
of these factors – the structure of the board of directors. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
With the advent of technology, the corporate world is becoming more and 
more dynamic. Not only consumer preferences are changing but business 
models are also completely being revamped. These changes also impact 
the way the boards and their directors operate and also their role and 
responsibilities towards the company and the shareholders. For example, in 
the world of increasing globalization, bureaucratic companies are becoming 
“hallmarks of modern society” (Zald, 1969). The board of directors of these 
companies, consequently, have great potential power.
The power of the board also differs depending on the nature of 
industry, company and the country it operates. For example, in Argentina, 
companies have evolved from shareholders being mostly the directors to a 
more complex management and board function. The scope of power of the 
board has expanded from the past in the country. Meanwhile, in New York, 
the traditional concept of board or management was of unrestricted authority. 
The board had unlimited power. However, now the board authority has been 
restricted through different laws and reforms (Horvath, 1969). As the world 
is becoming more culturally, technologically and socially advanced; people 
are becoming more acceptable of change and diversity, even in the board 
rooms. A study on Canadian companies found that women are increasingly 
serving as board members in both public and private sector. These women 
have personal contacts to come to this position as well as a good track 
record and past corporate experience (Burke, 1997). The representation of 
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minorities - women - in the board is also linked with different key metrics 
including executive and non-executive compensation (Shin, 2012). As 
more companies are becoming larger in size and are venturing into different 
geographical areas, the role of the board of directors of big multinationals 
is evolving. The board of foreign-based companies has three distinctive 
responsibilities; legal, internal and external (Leksell & Lindgren, 1982).
According to Patel (2018), the agency theory about the divorce 
between ownership and control provide the ground breaking work for 
drawing upon the basic concepts of governance. The board should try to 
reduce the agency costs and conflicts between owners i.e. the shareholders 
and the executive. The internal roles of the board refer to the strategy 
formulation and execution, and monitoring and controlling of results and 
management’s performance. It also relates to the integration efforts that 
maintain communication and coordination between different internal groups 
and business units. According to Leksell and Lindgren (1982), the board 
has both a passive and an active role in decision making. The board either 
serves as an advisor or counsel to the management or take an active part in 
maintaining a healthy relationship with the outside parties.
According to Shah (2011), the businesses in emerging economies 
like Pakistan have different dynamics. They are usually closely owned and 
controlled by people within the family. These families try their best to keep 
the business information to themselves, without disclosing to outsiders. 
These families have their own governance system and philosophy in place.
In additional, the board also serves as a source of discipline for the 
company. They ask discerning questions from management in certain 
situations and ensure that the company survives any crisis situation (Conard, 
Mace, Blough, & Gibson, 1971). The primary role of the board of directors 
is to protect shareholders’ interest. The board of large companies provides 
a safeguard to the stockholders for managerial employment contracts and 
the firm’s equity capital. The board serves as an important internal control 
for the company as they closely monitor management’s performance and 
takes part in strategic decision making (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). This 
helps to minimize the agency issue between management and the owners 
of the company.
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The structure and style of the board of directors are also associated 
with many key performance metrics of the company. For example, the 
presence of institutional holders has a positive impact on the company’s 
ROE (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991). Thus, while boards might seem as 
being homogenous and fairly simple from the outside, they are “internally 
differentiated and fairly complex social organizations.” A board whether 
small or large has the power to guide the company and to give it a future 
long-term direction (Hill, 1995).
Although some studies show an association between the company’s 
performance and board structure, the relationship has not been consistent 
with other studies. According to Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson 
(1998), the board composition and leadership do not have any “substantive 
relationship” with the company’s financial performance. While a company’s 
performance and the structure of the board might not be strongly link, they 
both are certainly associated with the top management’s compensation of a 
company. A study on Malaysian companies (ranging from 307 in 1979 to 
795 in 2000) listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) between 
1989 and 2000 showed that while top management’s pay was positively 
linked with the company’s sales revenue, it was negatively associated 
with the concentration of the ownership on the company’s board (Dogan 
& Smyth, 2002).
Executives’ remuneration is a multifaceted phenomenon that is 
determined by many factors including industry characteristics, firm’s size, 
ownership structure, individual characteristics, industry regulations, and 
market growth (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Growth and size of the 
company are also important determinants of top managements’ pay (Ciscel, 
1974).
Firm performance is positively linked with executive compensation as 
there is strong evidence that market and accounting returns affect executive 
remuneration (Canarella & Nourayi, 2008). According to a study that 
analysed data of Indian companies, a company’s current year accounting 
returns does not only positively impact CEO’s compensation but the relation 
is “marginally significant” (Ghosh, 2006). The study revealed that for every 
1% rise in the company’s return on assets (ROA), CEO compensation in 
India increased by almost 0.47%. This indicates that top management pay 
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is strongly linked with company’s overall performance. A study conducted 
by Sheikh, Wang, and Khan (2013) on the data of Pakistan, showed that 
the board size is positively, related to firm performance whereas outside 
directors are negatively related to the firm’s performance. Also, according 
to Patel, Shamsi and Asim (2018), market capitalization and return on assets 
have a major impact on executive compensation.
The increasing competition is forcing companies around the world to 
become more careful about their cash flows. As compensation of executives, 
fixed or variable, makes up a huge portion of companies’ expenditure, the 
decision regarding top management pay is one now of the most important 
decisions for any company, whether large or small. The importance of 
determining executive compensation can be seen from a study that shows 
that 89% of the total 232 large UK companies used an outsider consultant 
to determine the remuneration of their executives (Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 
2011). Around sixty-three percent of the 232 companies used more than 
one consultant to compute top management pay. 
Following several corporate scandals in the early 2000s and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there have been many studies focusing on 
the importance of corporate governance and determination of executive 
compensation. The global events did not only bring loopholes in the 
determination of executive pay packages on the spotlight but also changed 
board requirements of many countries to enhance the oversight function and 
control of the board.  Following the new reforms in US, many companies 
also lowered their executives’ pay as governance by the board over senior-
level management increased. For example; from a sample of 865 US firms, 
companies that were least compliant to corporate governance laws in 2002 
lowered CEOs compensation significantly after the new reforms. The 
decrease was around 17% higher than the more compliant companies. The 
result suggested that the structure and procedures of the boards materially 
impact decision regarding CEOs pay (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009).
While some studies show a positive relationship between having 
inside directors in the board room and executive compensation, other 
studies believe the relationship to be either ambiguous or non-existent. 
Many of the new corporate governance reforms across the world encourage 
companies to have independent directors in its board as they assume it 
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will bring more monitoring efficiency and would maximize shareholders 
value. However, the relationship between the dependence of director and 
the equity-based management compensation is found to be ambiguous 
(Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). While, dependent directors are found 
to be “relatively poor” in designing top management’s incentive-efficient 
contracts; independent directors are also associated with inefficiency in 
terms of monitoring and compensation contract designing. According to 
Patel (2018) share ownership by directors and performance of the firm 
have a significant negative relationship. Further, there exists a negative 
relationship between independent directors and firm performance.
Mostly large companies are associated with higher payments to their 
managers and executives. According to an early study by Baker (1939), 
large companies in America pay higher dollar payments to their top 
management. It is a common perception that large, state-owned companies 
pay high remuneration to their top management; however, many studies 
have shown that small, private companies also reward their executives 
with huge amount. This is due to the increasing competition in the global 
market and a pressure to hire the most qualified executives for company’s 
strategic and operational management. A study on Italian listed companies 
on the Milan Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2002 found that family-
owned companies pay more cash to the board compared to the state-owned 
firms (Barontini & Bozzi, 2011). The negative relationship was due to 
family-owned companies appointing family members on high pay and 
was consistent with other European and non-European studies. Moreover, 
Baker also believed that although large companies pay high dollar amount 
to their executives yet the pay to earnings ratio is quite low in these firms, 
compared to smaller companies. 
METHODOLOGY
Research Approach
To conduct this study, a quantitative research methodology was used. 
A deductive research approach was used for this study. The quantitative 
methodology will help us uncover the relationship between different data 
variables.
192
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 14 Issue 2
Data Collection
For the purpose of this study, secondary data was extracted from 
annual financial statements of the companies. This was downloaded from 
the company’s official websites, portals and the website of Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
Sample
The companies listed on the PSX – 100 (Pakistan stock exchange), was 
the population for this research study. The banking, insurance and financial 
institutions sectors were excluded for the purposes of sample selection, 
as this sector has different characteristics than the other sectors. The total 
number of observations were extracted from 50 companies for a five year 
period. The required data variables for this research were not completely 
or readily available on the data portals and needed to be handpicked for 
the research.
Regression Model
The following model was considered for the purpose of this study, 
considering executive compensation, dividends, firm performance and 
corporate governance variables. A one-year lag was used, as according to 
the previous researchers like Randøy and Nielsen (2002) compensation 
decisions of the current year were made on the basis of the previous  year’s 
structure and performance.
Ln(CEO comp)t = a+ b1 ln(% of IND)t-1 + b2 ln(% of NED)t-1 + b3 
ln(Market Cap)t-1 + b4 ln(ROE) t-1 +  b5 ln(FS)t-1 +  εit
Where:
CEO comp = Total Chief Executive Officer’s Compensation
% of IND = Percentage of Independent Directors = 
% of NED = Percentage of Executive Directors
Market Cap = Market Capitalization
ROE = Return on Equity
FS = Firm size
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Dependent and Independent Variables and their definition
Chief Executive Compensation = Natural log of the total compensation 
of CEO
Percentage of Independent Directors = Independent directors / Total 
directors on the board.
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors = Non-Executive directors / 
Total directors on the board.
Market Capitalization = No. of outstanding shares x Closing share 
price
ROA (Return on Assets) = Log of (Net Profit after tax / Total Assets)
Size of the firm = Log of Total assets (Control variable)
DATA ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 below shows the mean value of the 
total CEO compensation to be Rs. 23,949,837 and the median compensation 
is Rs. 18,000,000. Furthermore, interestingly Rs. 207,381,000 is the 
maximum compensation given to the CEO which is much higher than the 
mean compensation.
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Total CEO 
Compensation Board Size
% of 
Independent 
Directors
% of Non-
Executive 
Directors
Return on 
Equity
 Mean 23949837 9.000000 0.180852 0.546011 4.808097
 Median 18000000 8.000000 0.142860 0.571430 0.204200
 Maximum 207381000 21.00000 0.857140 0.928570 90.17000
 Minimum 0.000000 6.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -2.470000
 Std. Dev. 23434717 2.399308 0.179576 0.216529 16.33857
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Similarly, the independent variables like, the board size has a mean value 
of 9, whereas there are boards which were much larger than this and had 21 
members in total. The mean returns of the company i.e. ROE showed a mean 
return of 4.80%. However, on the other hand there were also companies 
having losses which is evident from the minimum value -2.47%.
Regression Analysis
 Table 2 presents the Fixed Effects specification results. The regression 
R2 value is shown to be 80% depicting the explanatory power of the 
model. It means that this model explains 80% of the variance in executive 
compensation. The F-statistic value is statistically significant i.e. 13.59 with 
a significant p-value which is less than 5%. 
The market capitalization and percentage of Non-Executive directors 
have a significant impact on the dependent variable i.e. CEO compensation. 
The percentage of NED has a significant but negative impact whereas, the 
market capitalization has a positive impact on the executive compensation. 
However, all other variables are shown to have a statistically insignificant 
impact on compensation.
Table 2: Applying Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: LNTOTAL_CEO_COMPENSATION
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.892992 1.191059 8.306043 0.0000
LN Board Size(-1) 0.538927 0.405466 1.329155 0.1853
% of Independent Directors(-1) -0.253930 0.354000 -0.717316 0.4740
% of Non-Executive Directors (-1) -0.623683 0.324723 -1.920661 0.0562
Return on Equity (-1) -0.007147 0.006151 -1.161878 0.2467
LN Total Market Capitalization (-1) 0.264449 0.040383 6.548466 0.0000
R-squared 0.805462
F-statistic 13.59427
Further, the random effects model was applied and the results are 
shown in the following Table 3. The random effects specification results 
195
Impact of Board Structure and Firm Performance
show that three variables have statistically significant impact and have a 
value of less than 0.10. These three variables include market capitalization, 
percentage of non-Executive directors and board size. All these have a 
significant impact on CEO compensation.  Also as per the results in the 
Fixed Effects Model, the percentage of non-executive directors have a 
significant negative impact on compensation.
Table 3: Random Effects
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 11.36520 0.836961 13.57913 0.0000
LN Board Size(-1) 0.573590 0.285856 2.006568 0.0459
% of Independent Directors(-1) -0.203974 0.312006 -0.653748 0.5139
% of Non-Executive Directors 
(-1) -0.514259 0.277758 -1.851468 0.0653
Return on Equity (-1) -0.002430 0.004178 -0.581686 0.5613
LN Total Market Capitalization 
(-1) 0.193765 0.029100 6.658672 0.0000
After applying the Fixed Effects and Random Effects Model, we 
need to check the suitability of which of the above two is preferable. Thus, 
the Hausman Test was applied and the results are shown in Table 4 below 
showing that the probability value is insignificant, having a p-value of 
0.1905, which is more than 0.05; so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
and we can conclude that the Random Effects Model is more appropriate 
in this research study.
Table 4: Applying Hausman Test
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 7.431206 5 0.1905
Table 5 shows the results of the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique, which was formalized by Professor 
Hansen (1982). Currently, it is the most popular method of estimation for 
reducing the possible data problems like endogenity, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the data. This technique can be applied if the collected 
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research data comprises of a lesser time period and with more cross sections 
in it i.e. T < N which is present in our data so we can appropriately use this 
GMM model.
Table 5: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
Dependent Variable: LNTOTAL_CEO_COMP
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments
J-statistic 0.031902
pval result 1.000
The J-statistic (J-stats) value is shown to be 0.0319 showing the model 
is fit. Further, the scalar p-value was calculated which is 1.000. Since this 
is higher than the value of 0.05 o we fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the instruments are valid and the model is appropriately 
specified and fit.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to find the impact of structure of the 
board and firm’s performance on CEO compensation. Interestingly, the 
results show that in Pakistan there is a significant and positive impact 
of non-executive directors serving on the board on CEO compensation. 
Similarly, the board size also showed to have a significant positive impact 
on CEO compensation. This means that the CEO’s are paid higher in the 
companies in which boards are larger than the mean size. This may be 
due to the lobbying, loss of directors’ control or problems in building 
consensus in controlling and reducing the executives’ compensation. On the 
other hand, the performance of a firm does not show to have a statistically 
significant impact on CEO compensation. However, market capitalization 
has a significant positive impact on compensation. This means that size of 
the firm does contribute to variations in compensation and that larger firms 
will usually pay more to their CEO’s. 
Future research in this area can be expanded by increasing the size 
of the data as well as accessing the data of companies in other countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
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